Chinese state-owned companies are involved in 78 African ports as financiers, builders or operators, representing 33% of the continent’s port infrastructure. This is part of Beijing’s broader strategy to boost trade flows and advance its geopolitical ambitions. Chinese-backed port projects span 32 countries, with a strong concentration in West Africa (35 ports). This compares with 17 in East Africa, 15 in southern Africa and 11 in North Africa.
China’s presence in Africa’s port sector is unmatched anywhere else in the world. By contrast, Latin America and the Caribbean host only 10 ports built, financed or operated by Chinese firms, while Asian countries have 24.
In some African ports, Chinese state-owned enterprises control nearly every aspect of development, from financing and construction to operations and ownership. Major conglomerates like the China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) secure contracts as lead developers, subcontract work to subsidiaries like China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), arrange financing and later acquire stakes in the ports they build. A prime example is the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria, one of West Africa’s busiest ports. CHEC handled engineering and construction, secured a loan from the China Development Bank (CDB) to fund the project, and later acquired a 54% stake in the port, which it operates under a 16-year lease.
China’s deep involvement in Africa’s port sector aligns with its economic and geopolitical goals. Financially, China earns up to US$13 in trade revenue for every US$1 invested in African ports. Controlling port operations also gives Chinese firms leverage over trade flows, allowing them to influence docking rights, shipping fees and service priorities, often favouring Chinese cargo. A firm holding an operating lease or concession agreement not only reaps the financial benefits of all trade passing through that port, but can also control access. The operator determines the allocation of piers, accepts or denies port calls, and can offer preferential rates and services for its nation’s vessels and cargo. Control over port operations by an external actor accordingly raises obvious sovereignty and security concerns. This is why some countries forbid foreign port operators on national security grounds.
Chinese firms hold operating concessions in 10 African ports. Despite the risks over loss of control, the trend on the continent is toward privatising port operations for improved efficiency. Delays and poor management of African ports are estimated to raise handling costs by 50% over global rates.
Another concern about China’s expansive port development in Africa is the possibility of repurposing commercial ports for military activities. China’s development of Djibouti’s Doraleh Port, long marketed as a purely commercial venture, was extended to accommodate a naval facility in 2017. It thus became China’s first known overseas military base two months after the main port was opened. There is widespread speculation that China could replicate this model for future basing arrangements elsewhere on the continent. This raises concerns about China’s broader geostrategic aims with its port development, and stokes Africans’ widely held aversion to being pulled into geostrategic rivalries. There is also a growing wariness against hosting more foreign bases in Africa. This underscores the mounting African and international interest in scrutinising China’s port development – and dual-use military basing – scenarios.
The logic behind China’s port dominance
China’s strategic priorities involving foreign ports are laid out in China’s Five-Year Plans. The current Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) talks about a “connectivity framework of six corridors, six routes and multiple countries and ports” to advance the Belt and Road construction. Notably, three of these six corridors run through Africa, landing in East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), Egypt and the Suez region, and Tunisia. This reinforces the central role that the continent plays in China’s global ambitions. The Plan articulates a vision to build China into “a strong maritime country” – part of its larger rejuvenation as a Great Power.
China’s focus on African port development was facilitated by the Go Out strategy, a government initiative to provide state backing, including massive subsidies for state-owned firms to capture new markets, especially in the developing world. Africa has been a central feature of the Go Out strategy, where port infrastructure was a major impediment to expanding Africa-China trade. Heavy Chinese government subsidies and political backing encouraged Chinese shippers and port builders to seek footholds on the continent. They benefitted from robust government and party-to-party ties that China cultivated over time.
Military engagement
China’s growing footprint in African ports also advances Chinese military objectives. Some of the 78 port sites that Chinese firms are involved in can berth PLA Navy vessels based on their specifications, while others can dock PLA Navy vessels on port calls. Illustratively, the PLA Navy has called on the following African ports in recent years:
- Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire)
- Gentil (Gabon)
- Casablanca (Morocco)
- Tamatave (Madagascar)
- Maputo (Mozambique)
- Tincan (Nigeria)
- Pointe-Noire (Republic of Congo)
- Victoria (Seychelles)
- Durban (South Africa)
- Simon’s Town (South Africa)
Some of these ports have also been staging grounds for PLA military exercises. These include the ports of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Lagos (Nigeria), Durban (South Africa) and Doraleh (Djibouti). The last involved exercises with landlocked Ethiopia. Chinese troops have also made use of naval and land facilities for some of their drills, including Tanzania’s Kigamboni Naval Base, the Mapinga Comprehensive Military Training Centre, and Ngerengere Air Force Base – all built by Chinese firms. The Awash Arba War Technical School has served a similar purpose in Ethiopia, as have bases in other countries.
Beyond direct military engagements, Chinese firms handle military logistics in many African ports. For example, Chinese state-owned enterprise Hutchison Ports has a 38-year concession from the Egyptian Navy to operate a terminal at the Abu Qir Naval Base.
Previous PLA engagement is another consideration. Of the 78 African ports in which Chinese firms are known to be involved, 36 have hosted PLA port calls or military exercises. This demonstrates that they have the design features to support Chinese naval flotillas, making them potential candidates for future PLA navy bases.
Considering just the design features, seven ports stand out for their likelihood of being employed for future Chinese military use:
- Luanda (Angola)
- Doraleh (Djibouti)
- Mombasa (Kenya)
- Walvis Bay (Namibia)
- Lekki (Nigeria)
- Victoria (Seychelles)
- Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)
Notably, these span both Atlantic and West Indian Ocean locations, despite the preponderance of Chinese port development activity in West Africa.
Advancing African interests
Former PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli noted that “overseas strategic strongpoint” ports were always envisioned as platforms for building an integrated Chinese presence. In other words, China has been highly strategic in its development and management of African ports so that this advances China’s interests as part of Beijing’s geostrategic ambitions. Looking into the future, it can be expected that China will seek to increase its role in building African ports to expand its ownership and operational control toward Chinese commercial, economic and military ends.
African debates on Chinese-built or Chinese-operated port infrastructure tend to focus on the impact these ports can have on advancing Africa’s economic output by improving efficiencies, reducing the costs of trade, and expanding access to markets. While some concerns are raised as to the implications these projects have on Africa’s increased debt burden incurred vis-à-vis China, rarely do these discussions publicly address the sovereignty or security dimensions of these port developments, or the role that commercial platforms could play in potential Chinese basing scenarios.
The heightened pace of China’s military drills and naval port calls in Africa in recent years has generated increased attention to these issues in African media, think tanks and policy discussions. The growing militarisation of China’s Africa policy is stoking concerns about the implications of more foreign bases in Africa. Some are concerned that Chinese basing scenarios could inadvertently draw African countries into China’s geopolitical rivalries, undermining the continent’s stated commitment to nonalignment.
Ensuring that Chinese port investments advance African interests will require African governments, national security experts and civil society leaders to grapple with the policy implications of these choices. Beyond the straightforward desire to expand export infrastructure are tangible issues of maintaining fiscal prudence, safeguarding national sovereignty, avoiding geopolitical alignments, and advancing a country’s strategic interest.
Bibliography
Kardon, I. 2022. (In)roads and outposts: Critical infrastructure in China’s Africa strategy. Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research.
Liu, ZZ. 2024. Tracking China’s control of overseas ports. https://www.cfr.org/tracker/china-overseas-ports (28 April 2025).
Vines, A, Tugendhat, H, and Van Rij, A. 2024. Is China eyeing a second military base in Africa as the US struggles to maintain one in Niger? https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/china-eyeing-second-military-base-africa (26 April 2025).
Wang, Y and Xu, Y. 2024. Direct impacts and spatial spillovers: The impact of Chinese infrastructure projects on economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa. https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/05/20/direct-impacts-and-spatial-spillovers-the-impact-of-chinese-infrastructure-projects-on-economic-activities-in-sub-saharan-africa/ (27 April 2025).
The post China’s dominance in African port development first appeared on LitNet.
The post China’s dominance in African port development appeared first on LitNet.