Abstract
Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei has been the most powerful politician in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) since 1989. Khamenei and his predecessor, the grand ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, emphasised the cultural and religious dimensions of their political struggle before and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The aim of the article is to investigate the interaction between Persian poetry and politics in Khamenei’s thinking, with reference to the political subject, the political community, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian influence in Central Asia and the Middle East.
The article uses a theoretical framework on politics and poetry that incorporates elements from the thought of Alberto Melucci (1986), Jacques Rancière (2011) and Crispin Sartwell (2010). The article itself is based largely on directed content analysis of a few poems and of Khamenei’s translated speeches and statements, which are mostly published on his official website. Khamenei’s views on poets and the art of poetry are discussed with reference to the Persian historical heritage, Persian as a language, mystical Islam, cultural imperialism, the so-called soft war, lifestyle and the Islamic civilisation.
The article also explores some of the policy practices and shifts in the political order, including the institutionalisation of poetry under Khamenei, and the operation of exclusion, censorship and persecution. It refers to the annual ceremonies for poets and religious hymn singers and the anniversaries of the Holy Defense or the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). It also deals with the poetry competitions and symphonic poems like “Sardar” (Commander), which were produced after Khamenei’s main security adviser, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, was killed in a US drone attack in 2020.
To link Khamenei’s promotion of Persian poetry only or mainly to the regime would obscure important aspects of his interest in poetry. The personal is also political in this case. Khamenei’s thinking about poets and the role of poetry within the political order is rooted in his personal experiences as someone captivated by poetry, as a young poet and as an activist against the Pahlavi monarchy, also during imprisonment and torture.
Reserved and circumspect as a decision-maker, Khamenei did not have the political charisma, the status as a senior cleric or the historical role of Khomeini as leader of the Revolution when he came to power. Intentional or not, his promotion of Persian poetry during his supreme leadership served as an additional source of legitimacy and authority among the competing political factions and distinguished him from Khomeini.
For Khamenei, poetry is central to the transmission, preservation and renewal of a religious and political community’s traditions. Poets have to defend the life and wisdom of the cultural group or nation, to resist cultural invasions, and to help to maintain an independent cultural identity. According to Khamenei, poetry fulfils these roles by promoting or not opposing a specific revolutionary ideology. In this regard it is important to recognise the mistrust of major powers and the experience of various invasions that the leaders of the Islamic Republic share with leaders of the Qajar and Pahlavi monarchies.
Khamenei promoted the status of revolutionary clerics among intellectuals in the post-Pahlavi period. He also confirmed the cultural role of poets and raised the position of religious poets. Certain poets were admitted to the class of official cultural producers who offer a counterbalance and alternative space to those cultural producers who are regime critics and receive Western support. Despite the resistance of certain clerics, the position of art, mystical Islam and activist Shia doctrines were consolidated within Shia Islam. Within the productive system of power to which Melucci refers, Khamenei reformed the rules of the game.
The autocratic elements of Khamenei’s rule stand in considerable tension to his intended cultural upliftment, because it excludes creative poets who are regime-critical, and sometimes silences them through censorship, intimidation and imprisonment. Political aspects of poetry, rather than beauty, serve as a strong measure of value. The regime affects the supply of poetry but also the demand for it.
Khamenei tries to develop personalities as political subjects and an affective community into reliable pillars of support. He therefore prescribes that poetry avoid certain themes, doubts and emotions. Televised ceremonies for the annual readings of poems, the commemorations of the Iran-Iraq War, and the memorial ceremonies for Qasem Soleimani have reinforced the role of poetry in the population. They also constitute an attempt to overcome any tension that might arise between poets as a cultural elite and the regime’s attention to the “ordinary people”. At the same time, Khamenei strengthened his alliance with the Revolutionary Guard as custodians of the regime and the organisational system.
The persuasive power and emotional effects of poetry, which is often expressed in song, renders poetry a powerful medium in Iran. Conveying values, examples and insights, evoking thoughts and feelings so as to shape and reshape people’s identity and self-image, poems and songs can permeate all sectors of the population. The collective intensity of ceremonies with Shia praise singers and mourners cheering on Iranian fighters and their allies in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, is striking. The symbolism of Qasem Soleimani’s life and death as a national hero and Islamic martyr is also prominently expressed through poetry.
The historical model of Persian kingship rested on social and political order being ensured by the monarchy and the faith. Both rulers and clerics enjoyed spiritual authority, but only the ruler exercised real power. The political order in Iran now rests on Islamist institutions, including the Supreme Leader, and the elected Republican institutions. Khamenei now formally has high religious authority, but also exercises the most power. As such, Persian poetry currently serves to strengthen the legitimacy of Khamenei’s role as a ruler, as it did with the historical kings.
Khamenei’s express wish is that the Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and the Islamic Republic of Iran will be remembered and preserved in history through poetry. The regime has achieved partial success in establishing among the new generations the founding myth, the symbols and the subjects of a new nation that arose through revolution and war. As Sartwell mentions, the political order and its operation cannot be understood without attention to its aesthetic aspects. However, Iranian poets and citizens deal with this heritage in diverse and distinctive ways, including those who support the regime and those who are opponents and draw solace from poetry.
The focus in the literature on Khamenei’s position as Supreme Leader misses a key aspect of his views on poetry, namely the influence of his experiences as a young spiritual and revolutionary activist. He experienced that the political community in Iran was so deeply divided between different conflicting visions and aspirations that they could almost be called different political worlds. He and other Khomeini followers were fighting an uphill battle against a strong state machinery and security forces. Yet even then he noticed how poetry could be used to weaken the authority of the monarchy’s rule.
When Khamenei promotes a reliable affective community through poetry and other means, he aims to support the current regime. However, in the event that the regime’s grip on the state institutions loses traction, he shifts his focus to a smaller cultural base, new cultural political figures and a new formation of power and meaning. Such a configuration might constitute a dominant faction within the existing order or even form a successor order. As often in Iran’s history, poetry serves as a servant of the status quo and as a precursor of new political enterprises.
Poetry and poets form part of the dynamic ways in which the Islamic Republic of Iran are politically represented, constituted and operated. Religious and cultural symbols and skills serve as sources to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy and authority. Poetry is used to support the model of leadership and the position of the Supreme Leader among political, military and cultural elites. Poetry plays a role in the formation of political subjects and interactions between the regime and the population.
Poetry forms part of Iran’s soft power and wider identity complex in its neighbouring regions, which serves as a counter to Western cultural and political influence. Khamenei has expressly stated the wish that Persian as a language of wisdom and science, and Iran as a Shia nation, thus command a leadership role in the Islamic world. The use of poetry and choices about poets and poetry often interact within the context of factional struggles and changing circumstances. Poetry is sometimes also an attempt to compensate for bureaucratic, material and ideological weaknesses within the political order.
Within and beyond a narrow affective community poetry can raise alternative visions and shift the horizon of meaning. In the case of contemporary Iran, several factors promote such a shift. They include the increased popularity of elements from the pre-Islamic Persian heritage, forms of Iranian nationalism, economic challenges and political discontent among sections of the population and diaspora. An interaction between poetry, events and cultural and political forces can create diverse meanings, moods and energies in a political community and restring the networks of institutions.
Keywords: affective community; horizon of meaning; Iran; Persianate; poetry; political order; revolution
● The photo of the Jamkarān Mosque in Iran used on the featured image of this article was taken by Alireza Jabbari and obtained from Unsplash.
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Persiese poësie en politiek in Iran: Die denke van opperleier Ali Hosseini Khamenei
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